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ABSTRACT
In 2005, the FCC changed the competitive landscape of the
high-speed Internet access industry by classifying both DSL and
cable modem service as “information services.” While many hail
this move as a victory for competition and free markets, others fear
the ruling could jeopardize the future of the Internet. This iBrief
examines the potential end of “net neutrality” and concludes that
new federal regulations are unnecessary because antitrust laws
and a competitive marketplace will provide consumers with
sufficient protection.

INTRODUCTION
“The Internet’s very future may hang in the balance.” 2 “[T]he
future of the Internet is at stake.” 3 These comments do not refer to a
powerful new virus or a new programming bug like Y2K. Instead, these
comments refer to the perceived threat of competition in the broadband
industry.

¶1

In the summer of 2005, the Supreme Court’s decision in National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services. (“Brand
X”) 4 and a subsequent Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
order 5 classified cable modem service and digital subscriber line (“DSL”)
technology (collectively referred to as “broadband services”) as
“information services” under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 6 This
change freed broadband services from significant regulation under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 by eliminating the mandatory common
¶2
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carrier requirements placed on “telecommunication services.” 7 The FCC
announced that this change in designation would “benefit American
consumers and promote innovative and efficient communications.” 8
Many consumer advocacy groups instead contend that this new
designation will make it “doubtful that the Internet of the future will remain
open and accessible to all.” 9 They contend that deregulating the broadband
industry opens the door for an end to net neutrality, which could “stifle
competition” by limiting the ability of small companies to compete. 10 Net
neutrality refers to an Internet where the infrastructure remains separate
from the content it carries and all data are treated equally by the carriers that
transmit it. 11 In a world of net neutrality, service providers are uninterested
in the content that flows over their networks and do not compete in the
content marketplace. Proponents of net neutrality fear that broadband
providers may awake from their slumber as passive network providers and
enter the world of regulating Internet content. 12 They worry that this in turn
could lead to a world of preferential content treatment, reduced consumer
application choice and possible blocked content. 13 To prevent these
potential dangers, consumer rights advocates including the Consumers
Union and the Consumer Federation of America have charged the doors of
Congress looking to mandate net neutrality. 14 The FCC, meanwhile, has
publicly backed the concept of net neutrality and maintains that the FCC
¶3
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will have the regulatory power to enforce net neutrality through its “Title I
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign communications.” 15
¶4
This iBrief examines the alleged need for additional regulations to
ensure net neutrality in response to the FCC’s reclassification. Part I
provides an overview of the competitive landscape in today’s broadband
service industry. Part II reviews the regulatory and judicial decisions that
have made an end to net neutrality possible. Part III examines the
commonly expressed fears over an end to net neutrality. Parts IV and V
explain how both competitive market forces and the federal antitrust laws
provide mechanisms to ensure that these fears are not realized. This iBrief
concludes that broadband expansion, not net neutrality, should guide the
FCC and lawmakers in future decisions about the broadband Internet
market. While regulations ensuring net neutrality could guarantee
consumers’ access to today’s content and applications, open competition
alone will guarantee consumer access to a dynamic Internet. Consequently,
calls for regulated net neutrality by consumer groups and the FCC are
misguided and could further limit the expansion of broadband Internet
service in the United States.

I. COMPETITION IN THE BROADBAND INDUSTRY
¶5
The Broadband Internet access industry is a competitive industry
marked by dynamic changes and quickly evolving technology. As one
economist has explained, “[T]here is no monopoly [in broadband]. . . .
[T]he broadband race today features multiple players vying for market
share.” 16 Cable modem and DSL services currently have market shares of
approximately fifty-seven percent and thirty-six percent respectively. 17
While these dominate market positions have been offered as proof that this
market is not competitive, 18 a closer examination reveals a different truth.
¶6
Although enjoying relative dominance in the broadband service
industry, DSL and cable modem services vigorously compete over both
price and service. Economic research conducted in 2001 found that the
15
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cross-price elasticity of DSL and cable services was positive, indicating that
consumers view the two products as substitutes. 19 This result means that
consumers will switch between DSL and cable modem service as a result of
price differences. DSL providers have been aggressively cutting the price
of their DSL services in order to attract new customers and keep their
current customers happy. 20 Additionally, while download speeds for DSL
services typically lag behind cable modem speeds, DSL companies are
improving their networks in an effort to provide equivalent download
speeds. 21 In response to DSL price reductions, cable companies have been
lowering access prices and increasing download speeds. 22 Competition
between these two services, however, presents only a limited view of the
future of broadband service competition.
¶7
The FCC changed the classification of cable modem services and
DSL services with an understanding of the dynamic nature of the broadband
Internet industry. 23 The FCC stated that “[w]e find that an emerging
market, like the one for broadband Internet access, is more appropriately
analyzed in view of larger trends in the marketplace, rather than exclusively
through the snapshot data that may quickly and predictably be rendered
obsolete as this market continues to evolve.” 24 According to FCC
Chairman Kevin Martin, “Most Americans today can choose between
several competing broadband service providers and service packages.” 25
With this choice of services, consumers are benefiting from “fierce
competition,” resulting in “faster and faster connections at lower and lower
prices.” 26
¶8
While a snapshot view of the broadband industry shows only two
dominant players, new entrants could quickly change the competitive
landscape. Almost 3 million Americans use high-speed Internet services
provided by satellite services, wireless phone companies, fiber optic wires
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or other wireline connections. 27 The use of these services is increasing at a
faster rate than broadband service use overall, with satellite and terrestrial
wireless services use increasing by fifty percent in 2004. 28
Two wireline options, fiber optic and BPL services, could soon
pose serious threats to the competitive dominance of DSL and cable modem
service. Fiber optic systems are being developed by a number of providers,
including traditional telephone companies like Verizon. Verizon’s multibillion dollar FiOS network is currently available in fifteen states. 29 BPL
service is expected to become available in the Dallas-Fort Worth area by the
end of 2006. 30 Wireless broadband offerings are also gaining ground.
Sprint, Verizon, and Cingular currently offer wireless broadband access that
can provide download speeds comparable to DSL services. 31 Verizon
Wireless’s broadband service is available to 148 million Americans with
speeds up to 2.0 megabits per second. 32 DirecTV recently announced plans
to invest $1 billion in developing a new wireless technology aimed
primarily at rural consumers. 33
¶9

II. REGULATORY CHANGES IN THE BROADBAND INDUSTRY
A. Regulation Prior to Brand X
¶10
Under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, providers of
“telecommunications services” are subject to regulation as a common
carrier. 34
As such, they “must charge just and reasonable,
nondiscriminatory rates to their customers, design their systems so that
other carriers can interconnect with their communications networks, and
contribute to the federal ‘universal service’ fund.” 35 In passing the
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Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress attempted to address the new
market of advanced telecommunication services by lessening the regulatory
obligations of services classified as “information services.” 36 Services
classified as “information services” are not subject to common carrier
regulation under the Telecommunication Act of 1996. 37 This decision
followed the FCC’s trend since the 1980s of reducing regulatory restrictions
on “enhanced” telecommunication services. 38
In passing the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress failed to conclusively decide if
cable modem and DSL services qualified as a “telecommunication” or
“information” service. 39 Federal courts, however, were forced to answer
this question through challenges to local or federal regulatory decisions. 40
In response to ambiguity concerning the legal status of cable modem
services under the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC issued a
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in March of 2002
that determined that cable modem service was an “information service.” 41
The FCC stated that “broadband services should exist in a minimal
regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation in a
competitive market.” 42

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Brand X Decision
Seven petitions were filed in federal courts challenging the FCC’s
2002 Declaratory Ruling. 43 These cases were consolidated in April of 2002
into the Brand X petition in the Ninth Circuit. 44 The Ninth Circuit opted to
follow its earlier decision in AT&T v. City of Portland 45 and determined that
cable modem service was part “information service” and part
“telecommunication service,” making it subject to common carrier
regulations under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 46
¶11
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B. Brand X in the Supreme Court
¶12
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision in June,
2005. 47 The Court determined that instead of following stare decisis, the
Ninth Circuit should have adhered to the framework set forth in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 48 which held that “ambiguities in statutes within an
agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the
agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion.” 49 In light of
Chevron, the Supreme Court concluded that the FCC had reasonably
classified cable modem services as “information services.” 50 Significantly,
the Court noted that the FCC did not have to immediately apply the
reasoning of cable modem classification to DSL providers because the FCC
was free to take a step-by-step approach in reclassifying the industry. 51

C. The FCC’s Classification of DSL as an Information Service
A few months after the Brand X decision, the FCC classified DSL
service as an “information service” in a Report and Order and Proposed
Rulemaking (“DSL Report”). 52 The FCC announced that its regulatory
framework “establishe[d] a minimal regulatory environment for wireline
broadband Internet access services to benefit American consumers and
promote innovative and efficient communications.” 53 The FCC’s decision
ended the requirement that DSL providers grant competing Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) access to their facilities. 54 Existing agreements between
competing ISPs and DSL providers, however, had to be honored for a
period of one year. 55 While the FCC freed broadband providers from the
common carrier regulations of “telecommunication services,” it also
asserted its continuing ability to regulate broadband Internet access through
its Title I ancillary jurisdiction. 56
¶13
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III. THE END OF NET NEUTRALITY
¶14
With the end of common carrier regulations for broadband service
providers, concerns about the continuation of net neutrality have emerged. 57
Net neutrality envisions an Internet that does not favor one application or
website over another. 58 With a neutral Internet, “the network is charged
merely with delivering bits, without unseen hands choosing which packets
to prioritize or regulate.” 59 Echoing the concerns of many consumer
groups, the FCC voiced its support of net neutrality in a non-binding Policy
Statement released the same day as the DSL Report. 60 In its Policy
Statement, the Commission announced that consumers were entitled “to
access the lawful Internet content of their choice . . . to run applications and
use services of their choice . . . to connect their choice of legal devices . . .
[and are entitled] to competition among network providers, application and
service providers, and content providers.61 These principles, however, carry
no regulatory muscle and are not currently enforceable. 62 In the DSL
Report, FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps noted this lack of
enforceability and expressed his preference for a “rule that [the FCC] could
use to bring enforcement action” instead of merely a Policy Statement. 63
The debate over net neutrality has recently focused on two areas: the
blocking of websites or applications by broadband providers, and broadband
providers granting different download speeds to different applications (a
two-tiered Internet).

A. Content Blocking
¶15
Content blocking is one major result that consumers fear from an
end to net neutrality. Proponents of net neutrality argue that Internet users
could soon find their use applications, such as Apple’s iTunes music store,
blocked by their broadband service provider. 64 Content providers seeking
to sell their own applications could block a rival application in order to
maximize their own sales. Consumers wanting to download music would
be forced to utilize the broadband service provider’s application because all
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other applications would be blocked. Furthermore, net neutrality
proponents argue that “keeping the network open has been the key to the
development of new services.” 65 Now that the FCC and the Supreme Court
have deregulated the broadband service industry, they argue that
Congressional action enforcing net neutrality is needed to ensure that
content is not blocked. 66 Indeed, without Congressional action, net
neutrality proponents argue “network operators will soon be able to put a
chokehold on the Web” through the control of content. 67
1. The Madison River Experience
¶16
The experience of Madison River Communications’ customer Doug
Herring provides a real-life example of content blocking. While traveling
through Tennessee in November of 2004, Mr. Herring attempted to call his
wife at their Alabama home but could not get through. 68 Mr. Herring’s
frustration turned to outrage when he discovered the reason behind his
inability to call home. 69 Madison River Communications, his DSL
provider, had instituted a policy of blocking rival Voice-Over-Internet
Protocol (VoIP) Internet phone services. 70
Madison River was blocking its customers’ use of Vonage’s VoIP
services. 71 After receiving notice of this action, the FCC quickly stepped in
to solve the problem. 72 Madison River entered into a consent decree
agreeing to pay a fine of $15,000 and agreeing not to block VoIP services
on its DSL lines. 73 The FCC pursued the Consent Decree through
“common carrier” requirements. 74 Yet, today this type of enforcement
action would not work because common carrier regulations are no longer
applicable to broadband providers. The FCC was able to use common
carrier restrictions in compelling the consent decree because the status of
¶17
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DSL providers as “information services” had not yet been established. The
recent change in classification “may [now] limit what VOIP providers can
do if their service is blocked by a broadband provider.” 75 The inability of
common carrier regulations to remedy this type of behavior under the
current regulatory classification of broadband services is one of the reasons
net neutrality proponents are demanding new regulations for the broadband
industry. 76
2. Other Content Blocking Fears
Broadband providers have sent out mixed signals regarding content
blocking. Madison River is the only content provider thus far known to
have blocked rival company’s content or applications. 77 Some broadband
companies have publicly announced their opposition to content blocking. 78
Other broadband providers have been sending different signals. AT&T
CEO Edward Whitacre Jr. remarked that, while Internet content and
application companies wanted to use his network for free, he “ain’t going to
let them do that.” 79 Although they have eschewed content blocking,
broadband providers have expressed their desire to expand their businesses
into the content and application arena. 80 Net neutrality proponents fear that
these companies will have increased incentives to block applications as they
begin to compete in the application marketplace. 81
¶18

B. The Move toward a Two-Tiered Internet
¶19
Another prevalent fear about the loss of net neutrality is the
emergence of a “two-tiered” Internet or an Internet in which select content
and applications would be offered at higher speeds. This concept is not new,
but it has moved to forefront of the “net-neutrality” debate as DSL
providers have increasingly pressed for congressional approval of a two-tier
scheme. 82 DSL providers are proposing a two-tiered Internet to provide a
fee based faster platform for content and application companies. 83
Predictably, many Internet companies have voiced their opposition to such a
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regime. 84 Google announced that it would not even entertain talks with
broadband providers on the topic of a two-tiered internet. 85
¶20
Speed differentiation is now possible through the development of
packet-based technology, which allows broadband providers to “control
which data gets to its destination first−whether it be video, voice or
otherwise.” 86 In addition to allowing broadband providers to extract fees
from application/content companies, this technology would allow
broadband providers to offer their own content/applications at greater
speeds than rival products. While stopping short of blocking an application
outright, a broadband provider could decrease the available speed of an
application so that the application could not effectively compete with other
applications running at faster speeds. Consumers would be left with the
choice of using the broadband provider’s own service, or selecting an
inferior option.
¶21
Although DSL providers are leading the push for a two-tiered
Internet, cable broadband providers have also expressed an interest in
varying internet speeds. Cable providers’ version of a two-tiered Internet,
however, appears aimed at increasing consumer choice rather than at
harming content and application providers. In particular, cable companies
are now offering consumers the choice of purchasing increased bandwidth
for an additional fee. 87

C. The Impending Deadline
¶22
Proponents of net neutrality mark January, 2008, as a potential
“breakpoint” in the future of the Internet. 88 Restrictions imposed by the
FCC for approval of the Verizon Communications/MCI and SBC/AT&T
mergers end in early 2008. 89 These restrictions included an agreement not
to block content access to web sites for a period of two years. 90 Thus, while
phone companies have said that they would never engage in content
blocking—and indeed, they have not yet done so—net neutrality proponents
fear that they may change their mind once they are legally free to do so.
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IV. NET NEUTRALITY: A LOT OF SMOKE, BUT NO FIRE
¶23
Those calling for net neutrality regulations claim that “unrestrained
commerce [will] throttle [the Internet’s] freedom and innovation.” 91 With
broadband providers expanding their product lines to include content as
well as access services, net neutrality proponents fear the diversity of
content and applications on the Internet will be crushed by the profit
motivated actions of broadband providers. They fear that the unregulated
nature of the broadband market will allow broadband providers to destroy
the vitality of the Internet. This fear, however, does not properly
acknowledge the current state of the broadband service industry. The highspeed Internet access industry is a competitive industry with new entrants
adding to the competitive landscape every day. In this competitive
environment, net neutrality fears are misplaced. Furthermore, while
proponents of net neutrality seek to protect consumers by preventing the
expansion of broadband providers into the content and application markets,
such an expansion could actually offer great benefits to consumers.

B. Blocking Content and A Two-Tiered Internet in a Competitive
Environment
¶24
With a backdrop of competition in the broadband Internet access
market, the net neutrality becomes “a solution in search of a problem.” 92
Content blocking in particular poses limited danger to consumers in light of
the competitive landscape. Without market power, content blocking is a
losing proposition for broadband service providers. Fundamentally, a
majority of consumers reject the notion of blocked Internet content. 93 The
Consumer Federation of America conducted a survey in which seventy
percent of respondents indicated that they opposed having content on the
Internet blocked by Internet providers. 94 With such strong consumer
preferences, broadband providers would suffer dearly for blocking
consumers’ access to content. If a DSL company blocked the use of
Google.com in favor of its own search engine, consumers who valued
Google.com would switch to a different provider. Indeed one DSL
company official noted, ‘“If [phone companies] restrict where people go on
the Net, they’d leave in droves’ for cable competitors.” 95

91
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93
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Losing customers is a frightening proposition for service providers
that have spent billions in infrastructure costs. It is estimated that providing
cable modem or DSL services to residential neighborhoods costs between
$300 and $500 per home. 96 This substantial initial investment requires time
to recoup and explains why Wall Street demands that companies report
subscriber growth in order to justify their investment in infrastructure. 97 It
is doubtful that content blocking could boost short term profit enough to
overcome the likely long term profit losses associated with losing
customers. It would take a lot of music downloads or subscription website
fees to justify losing the recurring revenue stream of a consumer paying
forty-five dollars per month for broadband service. Moreover, angering
current customers would undoubtedly have a negative impact on a
broadband provider’s ability to attract new customers.
¶25

¶26
Switching costs could reduce the ability of customers to move to a
new provider if their current broadband service blocked content by
providing significant financial incentives to stay with the incumbent
provider. A competitive marketplace, however, significantly reduces the
threat of switching costs. In an industry where firms aggressively compete
on price and download speed, it is not a stretch to assume that terms of
service will also be evaluated in a competitive environment. If a firm took
advantage of onerous switching costs to extract short term profits from its
customers, it would likely suffer long term consequences. Consider the
example of Madison River. If Madison River’s customers truly valued
Vonage but were prevented from switching to a new provider because of
high short term switching costs, the long term consequences for Madison
River would be disastrous. When the terms expired, consumers would flock
in large numbers to a competing service that did not block Vonage’s
services. This high rate of churn (the industry term for losing customers)
would be devastating to the company’s bottom line.
¶27
The potential for a two-tiered Internet is likewise unlikely to harm
consumers in a competitive marketplace. If a broadband provider tried to
use varying speeds to push its own application or content, it would face the
same consumer reaction as it would with content blocking; dissatisfied
consumers would leave for another provider. Again, this is a nightmare
situation for broadband companies because of the fixed costs associated
with deploying a network. Fears about a two-tiered Internet stifling
competition miss the bigger picture and ignores the reality of the Internet.
For instance, if a broadband provider were to require every blog to pay a fee
or be stuck with slow speeds, bloggers would leave en masse for another
96
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provider. The ability of consumers to demand services they desire in a
competitive marketplace guarantees that a two-tiered Internet will not
thwart innovation and diverse content. Consumers should support any
increase in competition in the broadband industry that would force
providers to extract fees from these mammoth content companies in order to
offer consumers lower prices for access.
¶28
In a competitive marketplace, content blocking and the use of a
two-tiered Internet to push proprietary content pose little danger to
consumers. While these strategies could form an effective short term
method of boosting a provider’s profitability, the potential for long term
market share erosion should convince any rational provider to eschew these
strategies. .

B. The Benefits of a Non-Neutral Internet
¶29
Net neutrality fears are also misplaced because a non-neutral
Internet would likely benefit consumers by expanding broadband
penetration and offering an increased variety of applications/content on the
Internet. In contrast, increased regulation or a heavy handed application of
the FCC’s Title I ancillary powers are likely to impede the prospects of
universal broadband access and the growth of application variety.

1. Broadband Expansion
¶30
In March of 2004 President Bush said that he wanted the United
States to have universal broadband access by 2007. 98 The United States
broadband penetration currently stands at approximately eleven percent. 99
This level of penetration ranks the United States at 16th in the world in
2005, a drop from thirteenth in 2004. 100 The benefit of universal broadband
penetration in the United States has been estimated at $300 billion a year. 101
If the United States wants to have universal access to broadband services,
there are only two plausible options: a new massive government spending
project or the development of universal service through private investment.
Assuming private investment is the preferable step, 102 the main obstacle to
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universal broadband penetration is a lack of incentives. Specifically, the
lack of incentives to build the networks and the lack of incentives for
consumers to purchase broadband services are blocking universal
broadband penetration.
The FCC took the first step toward creating the correct incentive
structure to build the networks by relieving broadband service providers of
the common carrier regulations. The FCC and commentators agree that
these restrictions reduced the incentive for broadband companies to invest
in their infrastructure. 103 When a rival is given free access to a company’s
capital improvements there is little reason to invest in costly improvements.
Whereas when investing in the infrastructure provides a competitive
advantage, the incentive to invest in capital improvements is great. Just as
common carrier regulations limited the incentive to invest, limiting the
ability of broadband providers to compete in the content/application market
will dampen the incentives for future investment. The cost of deploying
new technologies is staggering. In 2000, the National Exchange Carriers
Association estimated that the cost of upgrading rural telephone lines not
currently DSL capable would be $10.9 billion. 104 While technological
advances in both DSL and wireless service providers have certainly lowered
this figure, achieving universal access is an expensive proposition. To
ensure the continued investment of billions of dollars in new infrastructure,
broadband providers need assurances that they will be able to profit from
their investments.
¶31

¶32
One way to persuade broadband services to expand their service
area to all corners of America and upgrade their existing facilities would be
to allow broadband services to compete in the content and application
markets. Broadband providers have shown interest in recouping the
development cost of their networks through the application/content
market. 105 Broadband service providers could compete in a variety of
application markets including VoIP, music download services, online
gaming, subscription content services, and the emerging IP-TV market. By
competing in these markets, broadband service providers will gain
additional revenues to fund infrastructure improvements. The incentive to

for a new multi-billion dollar domestic infrastructure expansion in the current
political climate.
103
FCC DSL order, supra note 5, at 14877-78; Hazlett, supra note 16, at 210;
Crandall, supra note 19, at 113.
104
Lee Rainie, Peter Bell & Pavani Reddy, Rural Areas and the Internet, PEW
INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, Feb. 17, 2007,
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Rural_Report.pdf.
105
Yang, supra note 67, (Quoting Link Hoewing, vice-president for Internet
policy at Verizon Communications, “If I can find new ways to pay for this
network, it's gravy for everyone”).

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 15

upgrade a network in order to offer the speeds necessary to provide IP-TV
are greatly increased if a broadband service provider feels that they can
profit from deployment of an IP-TV market on their network. 106
Additionally, universal penetration cannot be achieved without
improvements in consumer incentives. Even if broadband access is
available to every consumer in America, universal penetration will only be
achieved if every consumer chooses to use the offered access. Allowing
broadband providers to compete in the application market will drive
consumer demand in two ways. First, the development of new bandwidth
intensive applications will lead to an increase in consumer demand for
broadband services. 107 As the ability of a broadband connection to
significantly improve the entertainment, business, and educational options
of consumers increase, demand for broadband will rise. Second, additional
competitors in both the broadband market and the application market will
lower prices of both.
¶33

2. Other Consumer Benefits from a Non-Neutral Net
¶34
In addition to benefiting from universal access, consumers would
benefit through additional competition in the application/content market.
More competition means lower prices, increased variety, and a larger
incentive for companies to innovate. 108 With a competitive broadband
environment, and the understanding that blocking content will drive
consumers away, broadband providers wanting to gain revenues through the
content/application markets will be forced to compete on price and
innovation to attract consumers. As technological advances blur the
distinction between traditional phone, television, and Internet services,
consumers should welcome every potential competitor, even their
broadband service provider. Google, iTunes, NBC Universal and AOL are
all planning to sell TV programs to consumers through the Internet. 109
Consumers would greatly benefit if this list grew to include Verizon,
Comcast, DirecTV, and every other potential broadband provider.
¶35
Broadband providers will also have an incentive to finance the
development of new products if they are allowed to compete in the
106
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application market. If a broadband provider developed a better version of
VoIP, they would not only gain revenues from the VoIP market but also
induce consumers to switch to that broadband service. This in turn will lead
to new innovations from other broadband providers and independent
application providers attempting to win back consumers. By entering the
application market, broadband providers will facilitate the competitive tugof-war over consumers that drives innovation and lowers prices.
¶36
A two-tiered Internet also offers consumers substantial benefits. As
more consumers use high bandwidth applications, “bottlenecks” in the
internet are more common and the speed of downloads decreases. 110 To
combat these delays, DSL companies are proposing a two-tiered Internet
that would allow consumers to pay additional rates for greater download
speed. One DSL provider has argued that a two-tiered Internet will
“guarantee that an Internet-TV viewer doesn’t experience annoying
millisecond delays during the Super Bowl because his teenage daughter is
downloading music files in another room.” 111 Offering consumers choices
in download speeds enhances efficiency by allowing consumers to choose
what Internet speed best serves their purposes. Different Internet activities
require vastly different download speeds. A consumer interested in highdefinition television programming may require speeds up to 19 megabits per
second. 112 Under a single tier Internet approach, a provider would only be
able to meet this consumer’s speed demands by charging all other
consumers for speeds that they do not want, which could lower aggregate
consumer welfare by excluding some consumers from the market for
broadband services.

V. ANTITRUST LAWS AS A SOLUTION WHERE COMPETITION FAILS
¶37
Where competition in the broadband service market exists,
competitive market forces will protect consumers from the dangers of a
non-neutral internet. Where competition breaks down or does not exist at
all, antitrust laws can be used to provide consumers the necessary
protection. In particular markets where a broadband provider enjoys
monopoly power, Section 2 of the Sherman Act 113 will provide a remedy
for anti-competitive behavior and an incentive for the monopolist not to
engage in harmful business practices. Furthermore, where competition
breaks down due to collusion among broadband providers, Section 1 of the
Sherman Act 114 provides a remedy and steep punishment for the guilty

110

Id.
Yang, supra note 67.
112
CRANDALL, supra note 19, at 131.
113
The Sherman Antitrust Act §2, 15 U.S.C. §2 (2000).
114
15 U.S.C. §1.
111

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 15

parties. The presence of this legal mechanism to address potential harms in
the absence of competition makes additional regulation unnecessary. 115

A. Monopolization
¶38
A monopolization claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
requires two main elements. First, a firm must be found to possess
monopoly power in the relevant product market. 116 In addition to the
possession of monopoly power, a firm must also engage in anti-competitive
behavior. 117 If a court determines that a broadband service provider has
monopoly power in a given market, a Section 2 claim could exist if the firm
were to engage in behavior that harmed the competitive process.

1. Defining the Market
¶39
To establish if a broadband service provider possesses monopoly
power, the relevant product and geographic market must be identified. A
product market is defined by the goods that offer consumers “reasonable
interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced—price, use
and qualities considered.” 118 Broadband Internet access, defined broadly to
include cable, DSL and other emerging broadband technologies, constitutes
a single product market due to the substitutability of the services. 119
¶40
The relevant geographic market for a broadband service provider’s
potential antitrust violation is the local market. “The purpose of the search
for the relevant geographical market is to find the area or areas to which a
potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or services that he
seeks.” 120 For the broadband market, the geographic market consists of the
broadband providers that that are available to a particular person’s home or
place of business.
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While most Americans currently have more than one broadband
option and many new technologies promise to expand the number of
competitors in all markets, some Americans have only one broadband
option available. 121 A February 2004 study by the Pew Charitable Trust
found that twenty-nine percent of rural Internet users have only one Internet
option. 122 In local geographic markets where there is only one broadband
provider, the provider could be found to possess the monopoly power
necessary for a Section 2 claim. 123
¶41

¶42
In addition to the possession of monopoly power, Section 2
violations of the Sherman Act require “the willful acquisition or
maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident.” 124 Separating these two possibilities requires drawing a
distinction “between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and
competitive acts, which increase it.” 125 The key, however, is to examine the
behavior of a monopolist and determine if the conduct has harmed the
competitive process or merely harmed a competitor.
¶43
In a broadband marketplace dominated by a monopolist,
anticompetitive behavior could take many forms. Exclusive contracts with
key content providers could be found to disrupt the competitive process if
they effectively foreclosed the possibility of competition in the broadband
service marketplace. 126 Similarly, requiring consumers to sign long-term
contracts with harsh break clauses might significantly limit the potential for
competition in the broadband market and could give rise to a Section 2
claim. In addition to these claims, a monopolist broadband provider that
refuses to allow content providers to access its network could violate the
essential facilities doctrine.

2. Blocking Content and the Essential Facilities Doctrine
¶44
If a monopolist broadband provider blocked a competing
application or a content provider’s access to its network, one potential
Section 2 claim would be a violation of the essential facilities doctrine.
While the Supreme Court has only implied approval of this doctrine,
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appellate courts addressing the theory have approved its use. 127 The four
elements necessary to establish an essential facilities claim are: “(1) control
of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of
the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the
facility.” 128 These elements appear to be present in the case of a monopolist
broadband provider blocking content or applications.
¶45
The first element is met where broadband service is essential to an
application’s use. For applications requiring high download speeds to
operate effectively, such as digital phone service or music downloads,
broadband access could be found to be necessary for their operation. The
second element would be met where a court determined that an independent
application provider could not reasonably be expected to develop a
broadband infrastructure of its own. Given the high cost and technical
expertise needed to create an independent broadband network, this element
is likely met. The third element of the offense would be met when a
broadband provider blocked an application or a content provider’s use of
the broadband network. Finally, the feasibility requirement is satisfied if it
the broadband company can easily open up its infrastructure to the
application.

The potential for this claim is important not only because of the expost relief that it affords those injured by a monopolist blocking content, but
because of the deterrence that it provides for this type of behavior. The
Sherman Act is a criminal statute. 129 Additionally, violations of the
Sherman Act result in treble damages. 130 These steep penalties should
motivate any monopolist broadband provider to think twice before engaging
in anticompetitive behavior.
¶46

3. Potential Entrants: A Caveat to the Essential Facilities Claim
¶47
Significantly, the dynamic nature of the broadband service industry
may lead a court to determine that even in locales where only one
broadband provider operates, the monopoly power necessary for an
essential facilities claim does not exist. As Judge Easterbrook of the
Seventh Circuit has explained, “[T]he lower the barriers to entry, and the
shorter the lags of new entry, the less power existing firms have.” 131
127
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Although a determination that potential entrants exist could undermine an
essential facilities claim, it also offers consumers protection from the very
behavior an essential facilities claim seeks to redress. In a market where a
single firm offers broadband services, that firm enjoys price and service
control that they would not have if a new entrant came to the market. By
angering consumers through content or application blocking, it creates a
market environment where a new entrant could more easily win over
existing consumers. This would make entering the market more attractive
to the potential competitor and could result in increased broadband choice
for consumers. Although the consumer could potentially suffer in the short
run from content blocking, the long term consequences to a firm engaging
in content blocking in a market with potential entrants make it unlikely that
a strategic firm would choose to mortgage its long term business vitality for
short term gains.

B. Collusion in the Marketplace
Collusion, “the supreme evil of antitrust,” 132 should be the main
fear of net-neutrality proponents. If collusion exists, content blocking and a
two-tiered internet pose significant dangers to competition and consumer
welfare. If competing broadband providers in a single market collude to
block the content or applications of a rival, competition in the application
market would be harmed. Likewise, if competing firms agreed to slow
down a rival application in favor of their own proprietary applications,
consumers would suffer. These arrangements may have the effect of raising
the price of the application, reducing the available options to consumers,
and discouraging innovation. While this type of behavior certainly offers an
example of how an end to net neutrality could harm consumers, existing
antitrust law provides a means of solving this market failure.
¶48

¶49
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade.” 133 A concerted refusal to deal, also known as a group boycott,
generally falls within this prohibition on combinations in restraint of
trade. 134
For instance, the Supreme Court applied per se antitrust
condemnation to an agreement among suppliers and a full price retail store
not to sell goods to a discount retailer. 135 Likewise, if competing broadband
providers colluded to block consumers’ use of an application owned by a
rival firm, a Section 1 violation would exist. Moreover, if broadband
service providers conspired to set the price on applications or broadband
132
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service itself, a per se violation of Section 1 would exist. 136 Thus, Section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act already provides consumers and the Federal
Trade Commission with a remedy for collusive behavior that is harmful to
competition; there is no need for additional regulation in the context of net
neutrality.

V. CONCLUSION
¶50
Since its emergence the Internet has existed as a vibrant
marketplace marked by innovation and increased consumer welfare. By
providing consumers with faster download speeds, the broadband service
industry has expanded these gains and allowed for new technologies such as
VoIP, IP-TV, video conferencing, music downloads, and more. The recent
classification of broadband service providers as “information services” has
moved the broadband market closer to a free competitive marketplace. This
classification was made with the understanding that the broadband service
market today is a dynamic competitive marketplace. It has freed broadband
providers from “common carrier” restrictions and provided an increased
incentive for capital investments. Some consumer rights advocates,
however, view the new classification as a potentially devastating blow to
the future of the Internet. They fear that the classification will end net
neutrality and put a “chokehold on the Web.” 137
¶51
These fears about the end of net neutrality are misplaced because
ample protections exist in a competitive market and antitrust laws act to
further this competition. In a competitive marketplace, producers are at war
with each other over consumer dollars. Especially given the high fixed
costs of developing and improving infrastructures, broadband providers
have strong disincentives to engage in behavior that will anger consumers.
Furthermore, where the competitive forces of the market fail because of
local monopolies or collusion among competitors, the antitrust laws provide
a remedy for those harmed and a strong disincentive for broadband
providers to engage in anticompetitive practices.
¶52
Moreover, Congress and the FCC’s main concern should be
expanding the broadband market, and not policing vague “what if”
scenarios. Universal broadband access could offer the United States
immense economic and social benefits. Additional regulations, however,
will reduce the incentive for private investment in infrastructure. Likewise,
allowing broadband providers to enter vertical marketplaces will present
consumers with additional products and spark the innovation necessary to
expand broadband penetration.
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Net neutrality is indeed “a solution in search of a problem.” 138
Consumer groups and the FCC are fighting the wrong battle when they
demand that broadband providers remain content neutral. Brand X and the
FCC’s subsequent DSL classification were the first step in allowing
competitive market forces to provide consumers with better products at
lower prices. Continuing on this path requires the FCC and Congress to
remain neutral to the broadband industry. That prospect is a “net neutrality”
worth fighting for.

¶53

138
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